Timothy P. O'Neill
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
Copyright 2004 Law Bulletin Publishing Company
February 6, 2004
In Roadblock Case, 'Proprietor' Gives up the Store
On Jan. 26 in DuPage County, Robert Lidster was sentenced for driving under the influence. He was given 90 days in the county jail as well as 24 months of probation.
What made the case special is that a year before the Illinois Supreme Court had reversed this very conviction on the grounds that the police roadblock that directly led to his DUI arrest was unconstitutional. The court held that the roadblock had been an unreasonable search and seizure because its purpose -- merely trying to obtain information about a hit-and-run accident that had occurred at the same time and location exactly one week before -- was not weighty enough to justify stopping drivers based on no individualized suspicion.
The majority opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court expressed a strong belief in the propriety of its decision: "The right of an individual to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is an indispensable freedom, not mere luxury. It cannot give way in the face of a temporary need for the police to obtain information regarding the identity of the motorist at issue. As the proprietor of the constitutional rights of all citizens of this state, this court is commanded to draw a line... Without such a line, we will fail to prevent intrusive searches and seizures from becoming a routine part of American life." People v. Lidster, 779 N.E.2d 855, 861 (2002).
Strong language indeed.
So why is Robert Lidster now going to serve 90 days in jail?
The answer is that the U.S. Supreme Court last month reversed the state high court's decision and found that under the circumstances, this "information-seeking checkpoint" was constitutional. Illinois v. Lidster, No. 02-1060 (Jan. 13). Thus, Lidster's DUI conviction was reinstated and two weeks later he was sentenced to 90 days in jail.
How can this happen? Don't we live in a federal system that protects the sovereignty of states? How can the U.S. Supreme Court simply trump a decision of Illinois' highest court and force an Illinois citizen to be deprived of his freedom?
The answer is simple. The Illinois Supreme Court based its holding in Lidster on the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Although state courts are free to interpret the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court obviously has the final say on the meaning on any of its provisions. See Article VI, section 1, of the U.S. Constitution (the "supremacy clause"). Thus, under our constitutional system, the U.S. Supreme Court had every right to tell the Illinois Supreme Court that the latter's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Lidster was wrong. End of story.
Or is it?
Although the U.S. Supreme Court may have the last word on the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, remember that the Illinois Supreme Court has the last word on the meaning of the Illinois Constitution. And the state charter has its own provision, in Article I, section 6, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures in Illinois.
If the state Supreme Court had added just one sentence to its opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court would have had no jurisdiction to even hear the case. What are those magic words? Simply this: "We hold that the police roadblock that stopped Mr. Lidster was an unreasonable seizure under Article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution."
How can this one sentence prevent the U.S. Supreme Court from hearing the case?
The answer requires a little constitutional history.
Recall that for most of our nation's history, the U.S. Constitution had almost nothing to do with state criminal cases. For many years the limits found in the Bill of Rights applied only against the federal government. Starting in 1868 the due process clause of the 14th Amendment provided some limits on what a state could do, but for many decades after that, the U.S. Supreme Court rarely voided state criminal convictions on this basis.
Of course, everything changed with the Warren Court. In the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court used the due process clause to "selectively incorporate" many of the provisions of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth amendments, thus making those restrictions equally applicable against both the federal and state governments. Thus, for the last 40 years, state courts have spent more and more of their time considering provisions of the federal Bill of Rights.
But we still live in a federal system, and states continue to have a great deal of autonomy in running their criminal justice systems.
Consider this hypothetical situation. You are a justice on the Illinois Supreme Court. You are inclined to affirm a conviction in a criminal case. Before you do so, however, you must be sure that the state actors involved in the prosecution did not run afoul of any of the provisions of the federal Bill of Rights that are applicable against the state through selective incorporation. Recall that the Bill of Rights alternatively can be considered a Bill of Restrictions that cabin the exercise of state governmental power. It is impossible to affirm a state criminal conviction without first establishing that Illinois did not violate any of the restrictions imposed on it by the federal Bill of Rights.
But let's assume you have decided that the trial was unfair and you wish to reverse the conviction. Now the situation is completely inverted. For if you wish to reverse, there is no need to even look at the federal Bill of Rights. If a conviction is reversed, the state is obviously not depriving anyone of life, liberty or property, and the due process clause of the 14th Amendment is simply not implicated. The reversal can be based on an "independent and adequate" state law basis. And, obviously, the U.S. Supreme Court is jurisdictionally barred from reviewing such a state court decision. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
And this is what makes the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in Lidster so inexplicable. Since the majority held that the seizure was unreasonable, it had no need to base its decision on the U.S. Constitution. It could simply have relied on Article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution and thus have immunized its decision from second-guessing by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Moreover, even if the Lidster majority began with a Fourth Amendment analysis, the justices still could have based their decision solely on Article I, section 6, because the Illinois Supreme Court has long insisted that this provision is congruent with the Fourth Amendment. People v. Tisler, 103 Ill.2d 226 (1984).
Why would a state court ever reverse a conviction and base it on the U.S. Constitution? Legally and logically, this should happen only if the state court believes that it is being compelled by U.S. Supreme Court precedent to reverse a conviction it would like to affirm.
If the Illinois Supreme Court majority had been unhappy with the result in Lidster, it could have said, "We are reversing this conviction only because we are compelled to do so by cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment to find roadblocks such as this to be an unreasonable seizure. However, we are doing this only because we are forced to do so by the supremacy clause. If given the opportunity, we urge the U.S. Supreme Court to change its interpretation and reverse our decision in this case."
There are only two ways to explain the Illinois Supreme Court's strange opinion in Lidster. If the majority believed it was forced by the U.S. Supreme Court to reach a result it did not agree with, it should have said so. But if it really believed the roadblock was an unreasonable seizure, it did a grave disservice to all Illinois citizens by not basing its decision solely on Illinois law, thus precluding federal review.
Robert Lidster is about to serve 90 days in county jail. If the majority of the Illinois Supreme Court justices really believe that the police performed an illegal seizure, they owe the people of Illinois an apology.
As the self-proclaimed "proprietor of the constitutional rights of all citizens of this state," they should be ashamed of themselves. |
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